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1 Introduction
One of the most contested issues in South Africa’s burgeoning
jurisprudence on social rights relates to how the courts should enforce
the duties imposed by these rights. Debate has focused in particular on
the extent to which the courts should affirm an enforceable right to the
provision of basic needs by those who lack access to these needs. In the
South African context, this is a plight affecting a substantial portion of
our population, and must also be contextualised within the high degree of
inequality existing in our society.1
This article explores the relationship between a jurisprudence of basic
needs and the transformative goals of the Constitution. The question that
interests me is whether a jurisprudence relating to the fulfilment of social
and economic needs can have transformative potential, and if so, under
what conditions. My aim is to examine how such a perspective can
inform the development of our socio-economic rights jurisprudence in a
way that supports a project of social transformation consistent with
constitutional values and rights.
In the first part of the paper I draw on the work of philosopher and
political theorist, prof. Nancy Fraser, to examine the concepts of social
justice and transformation which are foundational to South Africa’s
constitutional project. The second part of the paper examines the specific
implications of the adjudication of social rights for pursuing a broader
project of social transformation and justice. The final section analyses
and evaluates the transformative potential of South Africa’s evolving
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights in the light of the theoretical
underpinnings I have developed.
* This article formed the basis for my inaugural lecture delivered on 4 October 2005 at the Law Faculty
of the University of Stellenbosch. I would like to thank Professors Andre´ van der Walt and Lourens du
Plessis for encouraging me to reflect on the theoretical dimensions of social rights adjudication. In
particular, I would like to thank Jan Theron for his critical perspectives and valuable comments.
1 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) par 8.
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2 Social Justice, Transformation and ‘‘Non-reformist Reform’’
2 1 Social justice in a transformative Constitution
The South African Constitution is widely described as a transformative
Constitution.2 Unlike many classic liberal constitutions, its primary
concern is not to restrain State power, but to facilitate a fundamental
change in unjust political, economic and social relations in South Africa.3
Thus the preamble of the Constitution proclaims that it was adopted ‘‘so
as to — [h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’’. The
founding values of the Constitution refer to ‘‘the achievement of
equality’’, ‘‘non-racism and non-sexism’’, and a system of democratic
governance that is accountable, responsive and open.4
The commitment to social justice is central to the transformative goals
and processes of our Constitution, and must infuse the interpretation of
the Bill of Rights. In the Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, the
Chief Justice, Dikgang Moseneke,5 describes the important role of social
justice in constitutional adjudication:
‘‘[I]t is argued here that a creative jurisprudence of equality coupled with substantive
interpretation of the content of ‘socio-economic’ rights should restore social justice as a
premier foundational value of our constitutional democracy side by side, if not interactively
with, human dignity, equality, freedom, accountability, responsiveness and openness.’’
By arguing that a conception of social justice should inform our
interpretation of rights claims, I am aligning myself with critical legal
theorists who argue that it is necessary ‘‘to step outside of’’ rights
discourse in order to fill rights with legal and institutional meaning.6 I
2 Karl Klare ‘‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’’ 1998 SAJHR 146. Klare describes
transformative constitutionalism as ‘a’ long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation,
and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive
political developments) to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction’’ (150). See Albertyn & Goldblatt
‘‘Facing the Challenges of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous
Jurisprudence of Equality’’ 1998 SAJHR 248 249; Van der Walt ‘‘Tentative Urgency: Sensitivity for the
Paradoxes of Stability and Change in the Social Transformation Decisions of the Constitutional
Court’’ 2001 16 SA Public Law 1; Botha ‘‘Metaphoric Reasoning and Transformative Constitu-
tionalism’’ 2003 TSAR 20; Moseneke ‘‘Transformative Adjudication’’ 2002 18 SAJHR 309.
3 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 262 (per Mahomed J); Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 7 BCLR 687 (CC); Minister of Finance v Van
Heerden 2004 11 BCLR 1125 (CC); Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 12 BCLR 1328 (C)
par 100.
4 S 1.
5 2002 SAJHR 309 314. See also Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2000 10 BCLR 1079 (CC) par 21; Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) par 1; Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape
2002 9 BCLR 891 par 6;Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 11 BCLR 1125 (CC) par 25; President
of RSA v Moddderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC) par 55.
6 Thus Klare ‘‘Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989’’ 1991 25 UBC Law
Review 69 101 argues: ‘‘One must appeal to more concrete and therefore more controversial analyses of
the relevant social and institutional contexts than rights discourse offers; and one must develop and
elaborate conceptions of and intuitions about human freedom and self-determination by reference to
which one seeks to assess rights claims and resolve rights conflicts.’’
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turn now to consider one theory of social justice and transformation that
I believe can assist in evaluating and developing our jurisprudence on
socio-economic rights.
2 2 Social justice as ‘‘participatory parity’’
Notions of social justice are of course highly contested in a pluralist
society. Any theory of social justice that is to do real work in interpreting
and adjudicating constitutional claims must be compatible with a
diversity of opinions regarding the good life. This is a pre-requisite in a
constitutional dispensation such as our own that takes seriously the equal
autonomy and moral worth of human beings.7 At the same time, it must
supply sufficiently determinative criteria for adjudicating concrete cases.
Finally, it must be consonant with the values and ethos of the
Constitution.
Fraser8 develops a theory of social justice based on the principle of
participatory parity. This principle recognises the right of all to
participate and interact with each other as peers in social life. As such
it is compatible with a plurality of different views of the good and ethical
disagreements. At the same time, she develops specific criteria for
assessing whether institutional arrangements accord people ‘‘the status of
full partners in social interaction’’.9 Formal notions of equality are
rejected as insufficient. Instead, her theory focuses on the substantive
requirements to ensure that everyone has access to ‘‘the institutional
prerequisites of participatory parity’’, particularly the economic resources
and the social standing needed to participate on a par with others.10
Fraser identifies two major obstacles to social justice conceived in
terms of promoting greater parity of participation in social life and
overcoming institutional patterns of subordination of different classes
and groups. The first, misrecognition, entails a form of status
subordination ‘‘in which institutionalized patterns of cultural value
impede parity of participation for some’’.11 This involves systemic forms
of discrimination and disadvantaging of certain groups on grounds such
as race, gender and sexual orientation. Examples are marriage laws that
exclude same-sex partnerships, social-welfare policies that stigmatise
single mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers, and policing practices
7 The recognition of the equal moral worth of people requires respect for difference and a diversity of
views and lifestyles: Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC): ‘‘The protection of
diversity is the hallmark of a free and open society. It is the recognition of the inherent dignity of all
human beings. Freedom is an indispensable ingredient of human dignity.’’ (per Ngcobo J par 49).
8 Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘‘Postsocialist’’ Condition (1997); ‘‘Rethinking
Recognition’’ 2000 3 New Left Review 107; Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution,
Recognition and Participation in Fraser & Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-
Philosophical Exchange (2003).
9 Fraser Redistribution 229.
10 Participatory parity is described as constituting ‘‘a radical democratic interpretation of equal autonomy.
Far more demanding than standard liberal interpretations, this principle is not only deontological but
also substantive.’’ See Fraser Redistribution 229.
11 Fraser Redistribution 87.
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that associate black persons with criminality.12 A second major obstacle
to participatory parity arises when some actors lack the necessary
resources to interact with others as peers.13 This distributive dimension
‘‘corresponds to the economic structure of society, hence to the
constitution, by property regimes and labour markets of economically
defined categories of actors, or classes, distinguished by their differential
endowments of resources’’.14 Thus, according to Fraser,15 social injustice
has (at least) two analytically distinct dimensions: misrecognition and
maldistribution.
These forms of injustice, while analytically distinct,16 overlap and
interact causally with each other. Fraser17 describes the nature of this
intertwinement as follows:
‘‘Economic issues such as income distribution have recognition subtexts: value patterns
institutionalized in labour markets may privilege activities coded ‘masculine’, ‘white’ and so on
over those coded ‘feminine’ and ‘black.’ Conversely, recognition issues judgements of
aesthetic value, for instance have distribution subtexts: diminished access to economic
resources may impede equal participation in the making of art. The result can be a vicious
circle of subordination, as the status order and the economic structure interpenetrate and
reinforce each other.’’
By theorising a two-dimensional concept of social justice, Fraser also
aims at countering the recent tendency of recognition struggles
(particularly in the form of ‘‘identity politics’’) to displace the distributive
dimension of social justice and to reify rigid group identities.18 A project
aimed at advancing social justice must seek to address both dimensions
and consider the impact of their interrelationship. Such a project aims at
overcoming systemic patterns of racial, gender, class and other forms of
subordination.
2 3 Affirmation, transformation and ‘‘non-reformist reform’’
Fraser19 goes on to consider institutional reforms and strategies that
can serve to promote greater participatory parity along both the axes of
recognition and redistribution, ‘‘while also mitigating the mutual
interferences that can arise when those two aims are pursued in tandem’’.
She clarifies, however, that she is not aiming to devise ‘‘institutional
blueprints’’, but to delimit the range of possible policies and programmes
that are compatible with the requirements of justice while leaving the
weighing of the choices within the range to citizen deliberation.20
12 Fraser 2000 3 New Left Review 114.
13 Fraser 2000 3 New Left Review 116.
14 Fraser 2000 3 New Left Review 117.
15 2000 3 New Left Review 116.
16 Fraser 2000 3 New Left Review 118 argues that under ‘‘capitalist conditions, neither is wholly reducible
to the other’’.
17 2000 3 New Left Review 118.
18 2000 3 New Left Review 110-113.
19 Redistribution 72-73.
20 Redistribution 72.
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She distinguishes two broad strategies for remedying injustice that cut
across the redistribution-recognition divide: ‘‘affirmation‘‘ and ‘‘trans-
formation‘‘.21 The distinction between these remedies relates to the level
at which distributional and recognition injustices are addressed. As
Fraser22explains:
‘‘Affirmative strategies for redressing injustice aim to correct inequitable outcomes of social
arrangements without disturbing the underlying social structures that generate them.
Transformative strategies, in contrast, aim to correct unjust outcomes precisely by
restructuring the underlying generative framework.’’
In the context of distributive justice the ‘‘paradigmatic example’’ of an
affirmative strategy is the liberal welfare State which aims to redress
maldistribution through income transfers. In contrast, a transformative
strategy would address the underlying causes of an unjust distribution,
for example, changing the division of labour, the forms of ownership, and
other deep structures of the economic system.23 In the context of
recognition injustices, affirmative and transformative strategies can also
be distinguished.24
One of the key disadvantages of affirmative strategies to remedy
maldistribution such as social assistance programmes is that they tend to
provoke ‘a’ recognition backlash’’. They can mark out the beneficiaries as
‘‘inherently deficient and insatiable, as always needing more and more’’.25
Their net effect can be ‘‘to add the insult of disrespect to the injury of
deprivation’’.26 This is illustrated by the many gender stereotypes
surrounding welfare programmes aimed at mothers and children. In the
South African context this is exemplified by popular perceptions that the
child support grant encourages young women to become pregnant and
encourages ‘‘dependency’’ on the State.27 In contrast, transformative
strategies by tending to cast entitlements in universalist terms promote
solidarity and reduce inequality ‘‘without creating stigmatized classes of
vulnerable people perceived as beneficiaries of special largesse’’.28
However, transformative strategies also have their difficulties. Strate-
gies aimed at transforming the underlying conditions of economic
injustice may seem remote for those faced with the struggle to meet
immediate daily needs.29 They stand to benefit much more directly from
21 Redistribution 74
22 Redistribution 74. She goes on to clarify that the distinction ‘‘is not equivalent to reform versus
revolution, nor to gradual versus apocalyptic change. Rather, the nub of the contrast is the level at
which injustice is addressed: whereas affirmation targets end-state outcomes, transformation addresses
root causes.’’
23 Fraser Redistribution 74.
24 Fraser Redistribution 75-76.
25 Fraser Redistribution 77.
26 Fraser Redistribution 77.
27 Goldblatt ‘‘Gender and Social Assistance in the First Decade of Democracy’’ 2005 vol 32 no 2
Politikon. The deeply gendered structure of the US welfare system is dissected by Fraser in her earlier
workWomen, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (ch 7) 144-160.
28 Fraser Redistribution 77.
29 Fraser Redistribution 78.
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income transfers that help meet subsistence needs. It can thus be much
more difficult to mobilise communities in pursuance of transformative
goals.30
However, according to Fraser,31 the dilemma of substantively
problematic affirmative strategies and politically impractical transforma-
tive strategies is not intractable. Affirmative programmes can have
transformative effects if they are consistently pursued. They can both
meet people’s needs within existing institutional frameworks and set in
motion ‘‘a trajectory of change’’ in which deeper reforms become
practical over time.32 Fraser33 elaborates:
‘‘By changing incentive and political opportunity structures, they expand the set of feasible
options for future reform. Over time their cumulative effect could be to transform the
underlying structures that generate injustice.’’
She calls these interventions ‘‘non-reformist reforms’’.34 An example of
a ‘‘no-reformist reform’’ in the South African context might be a
universal basic income grant. Such a grant together with other social
programmes assists people in their struggle to meet basic survival needs.
At the same time, it creates the security and space needed both for greater
participation in economic activities as well as popular mobilisation
around deeper reforms. By providing women in poor communities with
an independent source of income, it also expands the set of choices
available to them and assists in challenging women’s subordination
within the family and community.35 In this way an affirmative remedy
such as a basic income grant can set in motion a series of changes which
can have a transformative impact over time.
2 4 The unrealised potential of social rights advocacy in the US
An illustration of the interaction of affirmative and transformatory
remedies in the context of legal strategies to advance entitlements to
social benefits is provided by Lucy Williams in her account of welfare
labour rights advocacy in the United States. She documents how civil and
welfare rights movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s were able to
effectively mobilise around the legal breakthroughs in cases such as
30 Fraser Redistribution 78.
31 Redistribution 78.
32 Fraser Redistribution 78.
33 Redistribution 79-80.
34 Redistribution 79. She credits the idea of non-reformist reform to Gortz Strategy for Labor: A Radical
Proposal trans Nicolaus & Ortiz (Boston 1967).
35 The phased introduction of a basic income grant was one of the key proposals to close the large gap in
social security provisioning made by the government-appointed Committee of Inquiry into a
Comprehensive Social Security System in South Africa. See their report, Transforming the Present
Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social
Security for South Africa (2002) National Department of Social Development, Pretoria: Government
Printers. There is also a coalition of civil society organisations, the Basic Income Grant Coalition,
mobilising in support of this proposal (see www.big.org.za). For a discussion of the transformative
potential of an unconditional basic income grant, see Fraser Redistribution 78-79.
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King v Smith 36 in which the Supreme Court interpreted social security
legislation as creating by statute a categorical entitlement to the receipt of
cash assistance for families.37 The right to a hearing prior to the
termination of benefits under the AFDC programme won in Goldberg v
Kelly38 was seen as ‘‘a vehicle to empower recipients — to make them less
afraid of losing subsistence benefits in retaliation for taking collective
action’’.39
Furthermore she argues how winning recognition for the right to
welfare assistance introduced ‘‘a radically destabilizing concept into US
legal discourse in two distinct but related ways’’.40 First, by creating an
entitlement that redistributed income, it exposed ‘‘the socially created
nature of all background rules of entitlement and exposed their
distributive significance — that is their role in maintaining inequality’’.41
In other words, if rights are constructed it implies that they can be
reconstructed so as to promote greater social equity.42 If poverty is not
natural but a result of political, legal and social choices, it can also be
redressed through political will combined with appropriate social and
legal reforms.
Secondly, the concept of a welfare entitlement illustrated the notion
that entitlements could accrue to people outside of individual effort and
exchange in traditional labour markets. In doing so, it ‘‘challenged the
idea of a neutral and natural definition of effort and exchange’’.43 The
privileging of the ‘‘public’’ space of labour markets in traditional social
insurance programmes renders other forms of valuable social contribu-
tions such as the care-giving functions traditionally performed by women
invisible. Welfare entitlements have the potential to validate such
unrecognised social roles. It also exposes the false dichotomy between
traditional notions of independence associated with wage work and
dependency associated with the receipt of government benefits.44 The
concept of a welfare benefit (‘‘not the meagre amount of actual benefits’’)
theoretically gives some workers an alternative to wage work. In this way
it helps surface the reality of dependency in wage work relationships
created by the employer’s superior market power.45
Ultimately, however, Williams46 argues that the progressive movement
failed to exploit the transformative potential of the welfare entitlement
36 392 US 309 (1968).
37 The relevant programme, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), provided means-tested
cash benefits from tax revenues to indigent families with children.
38 397 US 254 (1970).
39 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty in Kairys (ed) The Politics of
Law: A Progressive Critique (1998) 575.
40 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 578.
41 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 578.
42 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 578.
43 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 578.
44 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 579.
45 Williams Welfare and Legal Entitlements 579.
46 Welfare and Legal Entitlements 580-581.
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concept. She argues that welfare and labour rights advocates unwittingly
played into a discourse that reinforced the economic status quo and thus
failed to advance a more fundamental redistribution. Welfare lawyers did
this by fixating on government transfer policy and failing to adequately
expose the contingency and distributional implications of the background
rules of property and contract.
‘‘Thus welfare law becomes a market corrective technique, an adjunct to private law, rather
than a redistributional hub.’’47
Labour lawyers failed to challenge the privileging of waged work over
family, care-giving in the organisation and distribution of social benefits.
By doing so, they alienated many potential allies and perpetuated a male
discourse of citizenship in the public sphere.48
Thus Williams illustrates how an affirmative strategy (the winning of
entitlement to a welfare benefit) had substantial transformative potential.
However, this potential was not realised as the underlying structures and
choices generating deep wealth inequalities in the US have not been
effectively challenged.
3 Social Justice, Democracy and Adjudication
3 1 Adjudication and participatory parity
Fraser’s49 project is to articulate a philosophical theory of social justice
under contemporary conditions. She also examines the institutional
arrangements, the broad types of policies and reforms that can advance
participatory parity under contemporary social conditions. In this
context, she explores the interplay between affirmative and transforma-
tive remedies as outlined above. It is no simple task to consider the
implications of her theory in the context of the adjudication of social
rights claims. Karl Klare50 observes, the fact ‘‘that South Africa opted to
accomplish some significant portion of their law-making through
adjudication is a decision fraught with institutional consequences’’.
As we have seen, Fraser’s conception of social justice is inextricably
linked to the notion of participatory parity in which patterns of
institutionalised value or lack of access to resources deny to certain
groups the possibility of participating on a par in social processes. It
rejects formal equality as insufficient:
47 Williams Beyond Labour Law’s Parochialism: A Re-envisioning of the Discourse of Redistribution in
Conaghan, Fischl & Klare (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization 93 113-114.
48 Williams Beyond Labour Law’s Parochialism 114.
49 Redistribution 70-72.
50 Transformative Constitutionalism 147. He cites the famous critique of adjudication of Duncan
Kennedy A Critique of Adjudication: (Fin de Sie`cle) (1997) 2: ‘‘The diffusion of law-making power
reduces the power of ideologically organized majorities, whether liberal or conservative, to bring about
significant change in any subject-matter heavily governed by law. It empowers the legal fractions of
intelligentsias to decide the outcomes of ideological conflict among themselves, outside the legislative
processes. And it increases the appearances of naturalness, necessity; and relative justice of the status
quo, whatever it may be, over what would prevail under a more transparent regime.’’
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‘‘On this view, anything short of participatory parity constitutes a failure of equal respect. And
denial of access to parity’s social prerequisites makes a mockery of a society’s professed
commitment to equal autonomy. Participatory parity constitutes a radical democratic
interpretation of equal autonomy.’’51
She observes that, although participatory parity supplies a powerful
justificatory standard, ‘‘it cannot be applied monologically, in the
manner of a decision procedure’’.52 There is ‘‘no wholly transparent
perspicuous sign that accompanies participatory parity, announcing its
arrival for all to see’’.53 Instead, ‘‘the norm of participatory parity must
be applied dialogically and discursively, through democratic processes of
public debate’’.54
Yet, adjudication is supposed to represent precisely ‘a’ decision-
making procedure’’ in which judges are given the power to pronounce
authoritatively on what justice requires in the case under consideration.55
The impact of judicial review on democratic processes has been a major
subject of academic debate in political theory and constitutional law.56 In
the context of highly contested social rights claims, the democratic
objection to adjudication acquires a particular intensity.57 Libertarians
traditionally object to social rights on the substantive basis that they
entrench an unacceptable role for the State and the courts in resource
51 Fraser Redistribution 229.
52 Fraser Redistribution 42.
53 Fraser Redistribution 43.
54 Fraser Redistribution 43.
55 In this role the judge is cast in the role of the ‘‘platonic philosopher-kings of yore’’: Davis ‘‘The Case
against the Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands in a Bill of Rights except as Directive Principles’’
1992 SAJHR 475 483. See also the discussion by Fraser Redistribution 70-71 on the ‘‘appropriate
division of labour between theorist and citizenry’’. The metaphor of dialogue has gained currency in
describing the process of judicial review under a supreme Constitution, particularly in describing the
interaction between the judiciary and legislature. This represents a less authoritarian and more
democracy-enriching model of judicial review than the monological model. See Roach ‘‘Constitu-
tional, Remedial and International Dialogues about Rights: The Canadian Experience’’ 2005 40 Texas
International Law Journal 537-576 (see particularly the sources cited 1-3). But while certain reforms to
litigation processes can enhance the diversity of voices able to participate in litigation, at the end of the
day the court ultimately has the power ‘‘to privilege some interpretations over others’’: Botha
‘‘Democracy and Rights: Constitutional Interpretation in a Postrealist World’’ 2000 63 THRHR 561
573. Lenta ‘‘Democracy, Rights Disagreements and Judicial Review’’ 2004 SAJHR 1 29 observes:
‘‘Judges most often write in a monological voice that effaces the appearance of freedom of choice, and
presents the verdict as forced by the logic of the situation itself.’’
56 For insightful reviews of the literature, see Lenta 2004 SAJHR 1; Botha 2000 63 THRHR 561.
57 It is naturally possible to constitutionalise social rights without necessarily vesting significant power in
the judiciary to enforce them directly. This could entail, eg, including them in the Constitution as
directive principles of State policy following the examples of India, Namibia and Ireland. However, in
the case of India, the judiciary has utilised the directive principles to infuse substantive content into
traditional civil rights, such as the right to life. See, eg, Shah ‘‘Illuminating the Possible in the
Developing World: Guaranteeing the Human Right to Health in India’’ 1999 32 Vand J Transnat’l L
435. See also Michelman ‘‘The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification’’ 2003 I
Con 13 28-30. In the South African context, eg, other constitutional institutions, particularly the SA
Human Rights Commission, have significant functions in relation to socio-economic rights, including
an information-gathering and monitoring role (s 184(3)). See Newman ‘‘Institutional Monitoring of
Social and Economic Rights: A South African Case Study and a New Research Agenda’’ 2003 19
SAJHR 189. In this article, I focus specifically on the implications of vesting power in the courts to
directly adjudicate socio-economic rights claims.
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redistribution.58 However, there is also an objection to the judicial review
of social rights from the perspective of democracy. It is emphasised that
social rights guarantees allow for a vast array of institutional and policy
measures. In contrast it is argued that the relevant norms in relation to
civil and political rights are relatively clear and uncontested.59 Both
representative and participatory democracy are undermined by giving
judges the power to decide highly contested issues of public policy. Thus
Davis60 articulated his opposition to the inclusion of socio-economic
demands as fully justiciable constitutional rights in the South African
Constitution as follows:
‘‘It elevates judges to the role of social engineers, concentrates power at the centre of the state
and consequently erodes the influence of civil society.’’
Many academic contributions that aim at explaining or justifying the
role of the courts in the adjudication of social rights focus on questions of
institutional politics — that is, the impact of judicial review on the
functioning of the legislative and executive branches of government.61
For example, it is pointed out that in recent times the legislature has
declined in political influence in comparison to the executive which ‘‘has
burgeoned in size, influence over the legislature and power over the
citizenry’’. 62 As executives and bureaucracies are usually only indirectly
accountable to the people, and given their extensive power to affect
people’s socio-economic well-being, there is an evident need for
mechanisms to hold them accountable for their decisions. In many
constitutional democracies, citizens have increasingly turned to the courts
to protect their rights, including in the realm of socio-economic
interests.63
However, it is the implications of the adjudication of basic needs claims
on participatory politics that I am interested in exploring further in this
paper. If the adjudication of needs claims operates to destruct radical
participatory democracy and depoliticises questions concerning the
58 See, eg, the discussion by Davis 1992 SAJHR 475 477 of the views of Nozick developed in Anarchy,
State & Utopia (1974).
59 See the discussion by Davis 1992 SAJHR 475 478-479 of Dworkin’s distinction between ‘‘choice
insensitive issues’’ which are equated with basic civil and political rights which are enforceable by the
judiciary, whereas ‘‘choice sensitive issues’’ are equated with socio-economic policy choices which are
best resolved through democratic processes. Thus Davis argues that whilst judicial interpretation is
inevitably indeterminate, in the case of ‘‘first generation rights’’, ‘‘judicial interpretation is often
predictable because background norms are uncontested’’ (484). In contrast, judicial interpretation of
‘‘second generation’’ rights inevitably involves contested policy choices, and is hence far less
predictable.
60 Davis 489. Lenta 2004 SAJHR 29 highlights the democratic erosion that occurs through judicial
decision-making in the following terms: ‘‘The fact that constitutional courts are regarded as the forum
for deciding fundamental questions facing the political community in the areas of employment,
education, housing, freedom of association among many others, decreases the number of decisions left
for the political arena and contributes to the erosion of politics.’’ (footnote omitted).
61 This is raised most frequently in the context of the ‘‘counter-majoritarian’’ dilemma created by the
institution of judicial review.
62 See Pieterse ‘‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’’ 2004 SAJHR
383 388.
63 Pieterse 2004 SAJHR 388.
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definition and meeting of needs it will ultimately undermine the project of
advancing social transformation through constitutionally-based pro-
cesses.64 At least we should be conscious of the implications of
adjudication in this sphere to maximise our prospects to developing a
transformative jurisprudence on socio-economic rights.
3 2 Adjudication and the ‘‘politics of need interpretation’’
In order to understand the potential effects of adjudication on
transformative strategies, it is necessary to examine more closely what
Fraser65 refers to as ‘‘the politics of needs interpretation’’. She describes
needs claims as ‘‘nested’’ in that they are ‘‘connected to one another in
ramified chains of ‘in order to’ relations’’.66 Thus it is relatively
uncontroversial to argue that homeless people, who live in non-tropical
climates, need shelter ‘‘in order to’’ survive (what Fraser calls ‘‘thin
needs’’). However, as soon as we descend to lesser levels of generality —
to questions such as precisely what form of shelter do people need and
what else do they need in order to sustain their homes — controversy
proliferates. As the chains of ‘‘in order to’’ relations are progressively
unravelled, the deeper the level of political contestation and disagree-
ment. As Fraser67 observes:
‘‘Precisely how such chains are unravelled depends on what the interlocutors share in the way
of background assumptions. Does it go without saying that policy designed to deal with
homelessness must not challenge the basic ownership and investment structure of urban real
estate. Or is that the point at which people’s assumptions and commitments diverge?’’
Thin theories of need assume that the issue is only whether various
predefined needs ‘‘will or will not be provided for’’.68 In so doing they
ignore the underlying relational chains and ‘‘deflect attention’’ from a
number of important political questions.69
Fraser70 identifies the politics of needs to comprise ‘‘three moments
that are analytically distinct but interrelated in practice’’. The first is the
struggle to validate the need in question as a legitimate political concern.
The second constitutes the struggle over the definition or interpretation
of the need. The third moment is the struggle over the implementation of
64 Fraser Unruly Practices 166 distinguishes between the following concepts: Institutional politics in
terms of which ‘‘a matter is deemed ‘political’ if it is handled directly in the institutions of the official
governmental system, including parliaments, administrative apparatuses, and the like’’. This ‘‘official
political’’ contrasts with what is handled by institutions that are defined as being outside the official
political system like ‘‘the family’’ and ‘‘the economy’’ (‘‘even though in reality they are underpinned
and regulated by the official political system’’). The second concept is ‘‘discursive political’’ or
‘‘politized’’. In this sense ‘‘something is ‘political’ if it is contested across a range of different discursive
areas and among a range of different publics’’. This contrasts with ‘‘what is not contested in public at
all and with what is contested only in relatively specialized, enclaved, and/or segmented publics’’.
65 Unruly Practices 163.
66 Fraser Unruly Practices 163. See also Michelman 2003 I Con 30-31.
67 Unruly Practices 163.
68 Fraser Unruly Practices 164.
69 Fraser Unruly Practices 163-164.
70 Unruly Practices 164.
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the need.71 She identifies two major institutions which serve to
depoliticise needs discourses in the course of these struggles. One strategy
is to define the needs as questions of personal as opposed to public
responsibility. Here the family is seen as a major institution for meeting
the needs in question.72 A second prevalent strategy is to cast the needs in
questions ‘‘as impersonal market imperatives, or as ‘private’ ownership
prerogatives, or as technical problems for managers and planners, all in
contradistinction to political matters’’.73 In this case the depoliticisation
of needs occurs through the institutions of the market economy in the
capitalist system. The effect of such depoliticising discourses is to
perpetuate class, gender and race relations of domination and subordina-
tion. Adjudication in a constitutional democracy such as South Africa is
a significant socio-cultural forum in all three moments of the politics of
needs.
3 2 1 The first moment: recognising needs as entitlements
The inclusion of a range of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights
in the 1996 Constitution can be seen as a successful struggle by various
political actors and civil society organisations to establish the meeting of
these needs as objects of constitutionally mandated State responsibility.74
By placing a constitutional obligation on the State to ensure that
everyone has ‘‘access to’’ a variety of socio-economic rights, the meeting
of the needs in question are clearly recognised as a public matter, and not
simply to be relegated to the ‘‘private’’ domestic or market sphere.75
The very distinction between ‘‘justiciable’’ civil and political rights
versus non-justiciable socio-economic rights is in itself deeply political. It
privileges negative liberty and the existing economic status quo, and
obscures the costs and policy dimensions of civil and political rights.76 In
constitutional democracies where adjudication is an important compo-
nent of a country’s fundamental governance structures, the exclusion or
weak enforcement of socio-economic rights can have the effect of
marginalising the interests of the poor and masking the socio-economic
71 Fraser Unruly Practices 164.
72 I would also add that the amorphous ‘‘community’’ also falls into this category of ‘‘privatizing’’ the
needs in question. Eg, by cutting back on State care for mental health patients on the supposition that
they will be cared for by ‘‘the community’’ or that ‘‘the community’’ can take care of AIDS-orphans.
73 Fraser Unruly Practices 168.
74 This struggle has not been comprehensively documented. For an abbreviated account, see Liebenberg
& Pillay (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book (2000) 19-20.
75 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) par 40 the Court
emphasised that ‘‘the national sphere of government must assume responsibility for ensuring that laws,
policies, programmes and strategies are adequate to meet the State’s section 26 obligations’’.
76 Pieterse 2004 SAJHR 397-398; Liebenberg Social and Economic Rights: A Critical Challenge in
Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 79 84.
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barriers to more egalitarian social relations.77 By contrast, the inclusion
of social rights transforms the issue of unmet needs into a question of
entitlement.78
The constitutional status of these rights clearly does not avoid on-
going contestation and the emergence of ‘‘reprivatization’’ discourses
aimed at re-establishing the needs in question as matters for the family or
the market to deal with.79 In the current era of neo-liberalism, social
assistance and social insurance programmes in many countries are being
privatised or cut back.80 This presents a new set of challenges for
asserting the State’s role in the public provision of social benefits to
mitigate current inequalities in resources. The constitutional recognition
of justiciable social rights provides oppositional social movements with a
potentially powerful tool to assert the State responsibility for meeting
basic needs.
3 2 2 The second and third moments: interpreting and implementing
needs as rights
How does adjudication relate to the two further dimensions of needs
struggles in late capitalist societies? The second moment is the struggle
around ‘‘the interpreted content of contested needs once their political
status has been successfully secured’’.81 The third moment corresponds to
the processes and institutions through which the need in question is
implemented and administered. These moments frequently result in the
proliferation of expert needs discourses and the creation of agencies for
the satisfaction of the need in question. These discourses are aimed at
translating ‘‘politicized needs into administrable needs’’.82 Expert needs
77 As Scott & Maklem ‘‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New
South African Constitution’’ 1992 Univ of Penn LR 1 29 argued: ‘‘Perhaps the strongest reason for
including a certain number of economic and social rights is that by constitutionalising half of the
human rights equation, South Africans would be constitutionalising only part of what it is to be a full
person. A constitution containing only civil and political rights projects an image of truncated
humanity. Symbolically, but still brutally it excludes those segments of society for whom autonomy
means little without the necessities of life.’’
78 As Fraser Unruly Practices 182 observes: ‘‘After all, conservatives traditionally prefer to distribute aid
as a matter of need instead of right precisely in order to avoid assumptions of entitlement that could
carry egalitarian implications.’’ Van der Walt A South African Reading of Frank Michelman’s Theory
of Social Justice in Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a
Transformative Constitution 163 196 also comments that the power of Michelman’s translation of a
moral obligation arising from extreme need into a Constitution duty ‘‘is that social theory and practice
do not remain locked into needs talk, but take place within the traditionally powerful discourse of
rights’’.
79 Fraser Unruly Practices 172 describes it thus: ‘‘Institutionally, ‘reprivatization’ designates initiatives
aimed at dismantling or cutting back social-welfare services, selling off nationalized assets, and/or
deregulating ‘private’ enterprise; discursively, it means depoliticization.’’
80 Williams ‘‘Issues and Challenges in Addressing Poverty and Legal Rights: A Comparative United
States/South African Analysis’’ 2005 SAJHR 436; Porter ‘‘Socio-economic Rights Advocacy Using
International Law’’ 1999 2(1) ESR Review 1 (discussing cut-backs in social assistance in Canada).
81 Fraser Unruly Practices 173.
82 Fraser Unruly Practices 174.
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discourses tend to be depoliticising by repositioning the people whose
needs are in question as individual ‘‘cases’’. As Fraser83 explains:
‘‘they are rendered passive, positioned as potential recipients of predefined services rather than
as agents involved in interpreting their needs and shaping their life conditions’’.
Judicial interpretations of social rights can powerfully shape political
discourse and administrative practice in both these dimensions. Brand84
describes the political and symbolic role of the courts around needs
discourses:
‘‘First, courts’ adjudication of socio-economic rights claims becomes part of thepolitical discourse,
even a medium through which this discourse partly plays out. Second, courts also occupy a
symbolic, or perhaps more accurately, an exemplary role with respect to poverty and need
discourses their vocabulary, the conceptual structures they rely on, the rhetorical strategies they
employ infiltrate and so influence and shape the political discourses around poverty and need.’’
Brand85 has illustrated how adjudication of social rights in the South
African courts has the potential both to reinforce and counter
reprivatisation discourses around needs, and to deepen or erode
participatory democracy. Here I wish to focus on the tendency in
interpreting social rights to divert attention away from the underlying
conditions that give rise to economic deprivations, and to take existing
resource distributions for granted. This is illustrated by the Constitu-
tional Court’s reluctance to probe the resource allocation priorities in the
Soobramoney case,86 accepting without much analysis the existing budget
allocation for the provincial health department of KwaZulu-Natal as the
appropriate framework for analysing the claim. The injustice that money
can purchase the needed treatment in the private health sector is
portrayed as a ‘‘hard and unpalatable fact’’.87 The State is not required to
83 Unruly Practices 174.
84 The ‘‘Politics of Need Interpretation’’ and the Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights Claims in South
Africa in Van der Walt (ed) Theories of Social and Economic Justice 2005 17 24. On the use of rights-
based discourses in social rights advocacy in South Africa, see Wilson ‘‘Taming the Constitution:
Rights and Reform in the South African System’’ 2004 SAJHR 418; Heywood ‘‘Preventing Mother-
to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment
Action Campaign Case against the Minister of Health’’ 2003 SAJHR 278.
85 ‘‘Politics of Need Interpretation’’. Significant ‘‘countervailing tendencies’’ identified by Brand in the
Court’s social rights jurisprudence that encourage participatory democracy are the requirement that
government social assistance programmes include permanent residents (Khosa v Minister of Social
Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC)); the acknowl-
edgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal of the role of the political agency of the property owners
and the occupiers in resolving the case (Modderfontein Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd
2004 6 SA 40 (SCA)); and the emphasis placed on the political agency of the local authority and
occupiers and mediation in resolving eviction cases (Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC)). To this I would add the requirement of transparency as one of the criteria
for ‘‘reasonable’’ government action in the context of social rights (Minister of Health v Treatment
Action Campaign (1) 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) par 123).
86 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC) pars 24-29.
87 ‘‘One cannot but have sympathy for the appellant and his family, who face the cruel dilemma of
having to impoverish themselves in order to secure the treatment that the appellant seeks in order to
prolong his life. The hard and unpalatable fact is that if the appellant were a wealthy man he would be
able to procure such treatment from private sources; he is not and has to look to the State to provide
him with the treatment. But the State’s resources are limited and the appellant does not meet the
criteria for admission to the renal dialysis programme.’’ (par 31).
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justify the allocation and distribution of health resources. While the
court’s restraint may be understandable from the perspective of
institutional relations, it nonetheless serves to ‘‘naturalise’’ systemic
socio-economic inequalities.88
In interpreting socio-economic rights, courts authoritatively declare
that a certain standard of provisioning fulfils or fails to fulfil the
constitutional obligation. In so doing, judicial discourse can serve to
artificially curtail democratic debate on the underlying changes needed to
transform social relations so as to eliminate conditions of deprivation
and inequality.89 To return to our earlier distinction, while the
adjudication of social rights claims may sometimes achieve affirmative
remedies, they may simultaneously deflect attention from more
transformative strategies to remedy social injustice.
Once the court has interpreted and upheld a social rights claim, the
focus shifts to the implementation of the court’s judgment.90 In this
process, judicial discourse can tend to position poor litigants and the class
they represent as passive beneficiaries of the court’s order instead of
active participants in defining their needs and the methods of their
implementation.91 As Fraser92 observes, these are highly complex
struggles as social movements aim at establishing State provision of
various needs in question, but ‘‘oppose the administrative and
therapeutic need interpretations’’. Even when needs become depoliticised
through the administration of need satisfaction, Fraser records ‘‘a
countertendency that runs from administration to client resistance and
potentially back to politics’’.93
88 Brand’s main critique of the Court’s jurisprudence is that it tends to endorse an institutional concept
of politics in which communities and civil society are viewed as passive recipients of needs predefined
by the political branches of government. He identifies as problematic, not so much the fact that the
court defers, ‘‘but what it is that it defers to’’. Deference is to the formally constituted official branches
of government and downplays the role of participatory democracy in the interpretation and
satisfaction of needs. See ‘‘Politics of Need Interpretation’’ 31-33.
89 In other words, adjudication can serve to ‘‘occlude the interpretative dimension of needs politics, the
fact that not just satisfactions but need interpretations are politically contested’’. Moreover, they
neglect the question of whether socially authorised forms of public discourse available for interpreting
people’s needs are adequate and fair, or ‘‘skewed in favor of the self-interpretations and interests of
dominant social groups and, so, work to the disadvantage of subordinate or oppositional groups’’. See
Fraser Unruly Practices 164.
90 See, eg, Pillay ‘‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-economic
Rights’’ 2002 LDD 255.
91 Eg, there is significant potential for structural interdicts to enhance participation by litigants and other
civil society organisations in the implementation of socio-economic rights judgments. See, eg, Davis
‘‘Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court after Ten Years’’
2004 ESR Review 3 5-7. Thus far, the Constitutional Court has been reluctant to grant structural
interdicts in socio-economic rights cases: see, eg, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (1)
2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) par 129.
92 Unruly Practices 175.
93 Unruly Practices 177. She cites the example of clients of social-welfare programmes in the US joining
together ‘’as clients’’ to challenge administrative interpretations of their needs: ‘‘They may take hold of
the passive, normalized, and individualized or familialized identities fashioned for them in expert
discourses and transform them into a basis for collective political action.’’ (180-181).
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3 3 Enhancing participatory parity
Paradoxically, despite its depoliticising tendencies, the adjudication of
social rights can also serve to enhance participatory politics. In his
contribution to the early social rights debates, Haysom94 articulated a
justification from the perspective of participatory democracy for
including a basic floor of justiciable social rights in the Constitution:
‘‘By constitutionalising selected socio-economic rights, society is elevating certain rights to a
necessary condition for the exercise of a minimum civic equality. This in turn, establishes the
conditions for democracy for the effective use of civil and political rightsThis article goes no
further than arguing that a minimum floor of rights should be constitutionalised to enrich
political contest and democratic participation not by limiting political choice but by
facilitating real participation in social and political rights.’’
Fraser95 argues in favour of translating justified needs claims into
social rights, despite left criticisms that they obstruct radical social
transformation, on the basis that they ‘‘begin to overcome some of the
obstacles to the effective exercise of existing rights’’. Thus they can help
to transform a formalist conception of classic liberal rights into
substantive rights.96 In other words, the inclusion of social rights in a
Bill of Rights can help infuse a substantive dimension into the Bill of
Rights as a whole. The Constitutional Court’s explicit endorsement of the
concept of the interrelationship and interdependence of all the rights in
the Bill of Rights underscores this point.97 Social rights have an
important role to play in securing civil and political participation while
civil and political rights in turn can help facilitate greater equity in
resource distribution. By emphasising the interdependence and inter-
relatedness of the Bill of Rights as a whole, the courts help to counter
some of the ‘‘recognition’’ problems associated with social rights and the
social benefit programmes they facilitate. This in turn helps establish the
conditions for a more inclusive, equitable public debate regarding the
measures needed to transform unjust social and economic relations.98 In
this context, the courts can serve as a forum for highlighting the needs of
those marginalised in official political processes and thereby enhance
democratic participation in the meeting of socio-economic needs.99
But if social rights are to make a meaningful contribution to
94 ‘‘Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-economic Rights’’ 1992 SAJHR 451 461.
95 Unruly Practices 183.
96 Fraser Unruly Practices 183.
97 See, eg, the Grootboom case pars 23 44; the TAC case par 78; Khosa v Minister of Social Development;
Mahlaule v Min of Social Development 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC) pars 49 52.
98 As we have seen, Fraser Redistribution 43-44 emphasises that ‘‘the norm of participatory parity must
be applied dialogically and discursively through democratic processes of public debate’’. However, fair
democratic deliberation concerning the merits of redistribution and recognition claims ‘‘requires parity
of participation for all actual and possible deliberators. This in turn requires just distribution and
reciprocal recognition.’’ To eliminate this circularity in democratic justice requires that we ‘‘work to
abolish it in practice by changing social reality by arguing publicly that the conditions for genuine
democratic public argument are currently lacking, one expresses the reflexivity of democratic justice in
the process of struggling to realise it practically.’’
99 Williams ‘‘Issues and Challenges in Addressing Poverty and Legal Rights: A Comparative United
States/South African Analysis’’ 2005 SAJHR 16.
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transformation, it is vital that they are substantively interpreted. If
individuals and groups are unable to reliably enforce their claims to the
provision of subsistence needs, the role of socio-economic rights in
enhancing participatory parity becomes largely illusory.
In the following section, I analyse the Court’s current jurisprudence on
socio-economic rights and evaluate its transformative potential.
4 Towards a Transformative Jurisprudence on Social Rights?
4 1 South Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence on social rights
4 1 1 Reasonableness review for positive duties
In the first three socio-economic rights cases it considered —
Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC — the Constitutional Court was
squarely confronted with the challenge of developing a model for the
enforcement of the positive duties imposed by sections 26 and 27. The
Court rejected the notion that these provisions impose a direct, unqualified
obligation on the State to provide social resources and services to people on
demand. It did so in the context of arguments raised by the amici curiae
interventions in the Grootboom and TAC cases. The amici sought to
persuade the Court to adopt the notion of minimum core obligations as
developed by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.100 The Court rejected an interpretation of socio-economic
rights thatwould ‘‘give rise to a self-standing and independent positive right
enforceable irrespective of the considerations in the second subsections of
sections 26 and 27’’.101 Thus the extent of the State’s positive duties is
qualified by the following three key elements:
. the obligation to ‘‘take reasonable legislative and other measures’’;
. ‘‘to achieve the progressive realisation’’ of the right, and
100 This is the primary body responsible for supervising States parties’ obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). In its General Comment
No 3, the Committee stated that it ‘‘is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every
State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the
CovenantIn order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core
obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use
all resources at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum
obligations.’’ See General Comment No 3 (Fifth session 1990) The Nature of States’ Parties
Obligations (art 2(1) of the Covenant) UN doc E/1991/23 par 10. For an application of this concept
in the context of the specific rights protected in the Covenant, see General Comment No 12
(Twentieth session 1999) The Right to Adequate Food (art 11 of the Covenant) UN doc E/2000/22 par
17; General Comment No 14 (Twenty-second session 2000) The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health (art 12 of the Covenant) UN doc E/C12/2000/4 pars 43-47; General Comment No
15 (Twenty-ninth session) The Right to Water (art 11 and 12 of the Covenant) UN doc E/C12/2002/11
pars 37-38.
101 TAC case par 39.
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. ‘‘within available resources’’.102
The Court voiced a number of concerns regarding the concept of
minimum core obligations. First, the Court identified the problem of
defining ‘‘the minimum core’’ given the fact that groups are differently
situated and have varying social needs.103 Secondly, the Court
expressed the view that minimum core obligations impose unrealistic
duties on the State in that it is ‘‘impossible to give everyone access
even to a ‘core’ service immediately’’.104 Finally, the Court held that
the minimum core was incompatible with the institutional competen-
cies and role of the courts.105 However, it did indicate that the
evidence in a particular case may show that there is a minimum core
of a particular service that should be taken into account in
determining whether the measures adopted by the State are reason-
able.106
The Court proceeded to develop a model of ‘‘reasonableness review’’
for adjudicating positive claims to the provision of social services and
resources. In reviewing the positive duties imposed by the social rights
provisions on the State, the central question that the Court asks is
whether the means chosen are reasonably capable of facilitating the
realisation of the rights in question.107 The Court is careful to emphasise
that wide latitude is given to the political branches of government to
make the appropriate policy choices, with the Court’s role being to
determine whether they fall within the bounds of ‘‘reasonableness’’.108
The reasonableness of government social policy is assessed primarily in
terms of its inclusiveness in the sense that it must cater for all major social
groups as well as for short, medium and long term needs.109 At this point,
reasonableness review seems formalistic and abstract, equating the needs
of the wealthy with those of the poor and requiring government to be
even-handed in attending to both. However, the Court goes on to
recognise that the ‘‘poor are particularly vulnerable and their needs
102 Grootboom case par 38.
103 Grootboom case pars 32 and 33. Thus in the context of the right to have access to adequate housing,
the Court highlighted the fact that the needs of differently situated groups are diverse: ‘‘there are
those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need financial assistance’’. (par
33).
104 TAC case par 35.
105 Thus it held that ‘‘courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and
political enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum core standards’’ should be. (TAC
case par 37).
106 Grootboom case par 33; TAC case par 34.
107 See Grootboom case par 41. This constitutes a means-end justificatory model in which the Court asks
itself the basic question whether a particular policy or programme can be justified. It will be justified
if ‘‘it is reasonably related to the constitutionally prescribed goal of providing access to the relevant
socio-economic rights’’. See Brand The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-economic Rights
Jurisprudence or ‘‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’’ in Botha, Van der Walt & Van der Walt
(eds) Rights and Democracy 33.
See also Brand The Racy in a Transformative Constitution (2004) 33 39-43.
108 Grootboom case par 41.
109 Grootboom case par 43.
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require special attention’’.110 Reasonableness is not assessed solely by a
statistical advance in facilitating access to the various socio-economic
rights. It is also informed by the dignity-interests of the affected group,
particularly the impact of the denial of particular rights on the affected
claimants. The Court held in the Grootboom case: 111
‘‘Reasonableness must also be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole. The
right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because we value human beings and want to
ensure that they are afforded their basic human needs. A society must seek to ensure that the
basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity,
freedom and equality. To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and
extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are most urgent
and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the
measures aimed at achieving realisation of the rightIf the measures, though statistically
successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test.’’
The standard of reasonableness review requires that government
programmes make some reasonable short-term provision for those whose
socio-economic circumstances are urgent or intolerable. In the Groot-
boom case the lack of a programme catering for immediate housing needs
was held to be unreasonable and thus inconsistent with section 26.112 In
the TAC case,113 the government’s rigid policy that it would not extend
the provision of the anti-retroviral drug, Nevirapine for purposes of
reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV beyond the 18 pilot sites,
was found to be unreasonable. There was simply no reasonable
justification for withholding a ‘‘simple, cheap and potentially lifesaving
medical intervention’’ from poor women and their newborn babies in the
public health sector.114 The Court emphasised that its ruling did not
imply ‘‘that everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment’’,
although ‘‘the ideal is to achieve that goal’’.115
In both these cases, the Court subjected the government’s justifications
for failing to make provision for the fulfilment of the basic needs in issue
to a high level of scrutiny. The resource and policy justifications for
failing to provide for the needs in question were found to be
unpersuasive. In the Grootboom case, the Court confined itself to a
declaratory order116 whereas in the TAC case, the Court granted far-
reaching mandatory relief requiring government to provide Nevirapine
and extend testing and counselling facilities at hospitals and clinics
110 Grootboom case par 36. See alsoTAC case par 70: ‘‘There is a difference in the positions of those who can
afford to pay for services and those who cannot. State policy must take account of those differences.’’
111 Par 44 (emphasis added).
112 ‘‘In other words there is no express provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, for people who are living in intolerable conditions
and for people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as floods and fires, or because their
homes are under threat of demolition.’’ (par 52).
113 Par 73.
114 TAC case par 125: ‘‘We have held that its policy fails to meet constitutional standards because it
excludes those who could reasonably be included where such treatment is medically indicated to
combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV.’’
115 TAC case par 125.
116 Grootboom case par 99.
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throughout the public health sector for the purpose of reducing the risk
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.117 However, the Court was
careful to clarify that the relevant provisions on socio-economic rights do
not give rise to a direct individually enforceable entitlement to the
provision of socio-economic resources and services. 118
4 1 2 The intersection of social rights and equality rights
The second type of situation where the Court has been called upon to
adjudicate the positive duties imposed by social rights is in relation to the
enactment of exclusionary social benefit legislation. This is well
illustrated by the Constitutional Court decision in Khosa v Minister of
Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development.119 The
case concerned two challenges to the validity of social assistance
legislation which restricted eligibility for social grants to South African
citizens.120 The Court held that the exclusion of the category of
permanent residents from the social grants legislation constituted both
a limitation of the right of access to social assistance (section 27) and the
right against unfair discrimination (section 9). It further held that the
requirement that both the adult primary care giver and the child be South
African citizens in order to be eligible for the child support grant
‘‘trenches upon’’ the socio-economic rights of children under section
28(1)(c) of the Constitution.121
In its analysis of the reasonableness of the legislative scheme in terms
of section 27(2), the Court closely scutinised and found uncompelling the
financial considerations presented by the State for limiting access to
social grants to citizens.122 The Court also rejected the State’s reasoning
that the exclusion of permanent residents from social grants was
legitimate because it prevented them becoming ‘‘a burden’’ on the State,
and thereby encouraged self-sufficiency among foreign nationals.
According to the Court, immigration could be controlled ‘‘in ways other
than allowing immigrants to make their permanent homes here, and then
abandoning them to destitution if they fall upon hard times’’.123 There
were other less drastic methods for reducing the risk of permanent
117 TAC case par 135.
118 Grootboom case par 95: ‘‘Neither section 26 nor section 28 entitles the respondents to claim shelter or
housing immediately upon demand’’; TAC case par 34: ‘‘the socio-economic rights of the
Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be
provided to them’’. See also TAC case par 39; Jaftha case pars 32-33 (distinguishing negative and
positive duties).
119 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC).
120 The relevant legislation was the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the Welfare Laws Amendment
Act 106 of 1997.
121 Khosa case par 78.
122 Given that the State had already acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the citizenship requirement
in respect of child support grants, the inclusion of permanent residents in the remaining social grants
would constitute an increase of less than 2% on the present cost of social grants. The Court thus
concluded that ‘‘the cost of including permanent residents in the system will be only a small
proportion of the total cost’’. (par 62).
123 Khosa case par 65 (emphasis added).
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residents becoming ‘‘a burden’’ to the State than excluding them from
gaining access to social assistance.124 The application of a proportionality
test in this assessment of the reasonableness of these two justifications
presented by the State is clearly evident. Ultimately, the impact of the
exclusion from social assistance on the life and dignity of permanent
residents outweighed the financial and immigration considerations on
which the State relied.125
The stringent standard of review applied in this case should be
understood in the context of the denial of a basic social benefit to a
vulnerable group, and the intersecting breaches of a socio-economic right
and the right against unfair discrimination.126 Having found violations of
sections 9 and 27, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of applying a
limitations clause analysis to the socio-economic rights in sections 26 and
27.127 It held that it was not necessary to decide whether a different
threshold of reasonableness was required in relation to section 36. Even if
this was assumed to be the case, the Court was satisfied that the exclusion
of permanent residents from social assistance ‘‘is neither reasonable nor
justifiable within the meaning of section 36’’.128 The Court granted the
strong remedy of reading permanent residents into the eligibility
requirements of the legislation.129
4 1 3 Reviewing deprivations of existing access
The third type of situation considered by the courts has involved
groups being deprived of the existing access that they enjoy to social
rights.130
TheConstitutional Court has characterised these situations as violations
of the negative duties imposed by social rights.131 They have mostly arisen
in the context of the eviction of people from their homes, reinforced by the
explicit guarantee in section 26(3).132 Much of the jurisprudence has
concerned the interpretation of key pieces of legislation enacted to give
effect to section 26(3), particularly the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).133
124 Khosa case pars 64-65.
125 Khosa case par 82.
126 Khosa case par 44: ‘‘What makes this case different to other cases that have previously been
considered by this Court is that, in addition to the rights to life and dignity, the social-security scheme
put in place by the state to meet its obligations under section 27 of the Constitution raises the question
of the prohibition of unfair discrimination.’’ See also par 49.
127 Khosa case par 83.
128 Khosa case par 84.
129 Khosa case pars 86-89; Order (par 98).
130 Jaftha case par 34.
131 Grootboom case par 34; TAC case par 46.
132 S 26(3) reads: ‘‘No one may be evicted from their homes or have their homes demolished without an
order of Court made after considering all relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary
evictions.’’
133 The PIE repealed the old Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 referred to above. Another
key piece of legislation giving effect to s 26(3) is The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
(ESTA).
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The leading decision on the interpretation of the PIE is that of the
ConstitutionalCourt inPortElizabethMunicipality vVariousOccupiers.134
The judgment illuminates how the PIE must be interpreted to promote the
purposes and values behind section 26(3). The case concerned an eviction
application by the Port ElizabethMunicipality against some 68 people who
were occupying shacks erected on privately owned land within the
jurisdiction of the Municipality. Most had come to the undeveloped land
after being evicted from other land. In launching the application, the
Municipality was responding to a neighbourhood petition. The Court
observed that section 26(3) acknowledges that the ‘‘eviction of people living
in informal settlements may take place, even if it results in loss of a
home’’.135 However, it went on to affirm that generally ‘‘a court should be
reluctant to grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is
satisfied that a reasonable alternative is available, even if only as an interim
measure pending ultimate access to housing in the formal housing
programme’’.136 Thus, in order to satisfy a court that it is ‘‘just and
equitable’’ to evict people from their homes, organs of State will have to
show that serious consideration was given to the possibility of providing
alternative accommodation to the occupiers.137 The Court also indicated
that, in the absence of special circumstances, ‘‘it would not ordinarily be
just and equitable to order eviction if proper discussions, and where
appropriate, mediation, have not been attempted’’.138 The critical point
that Sachs J makes in his judgment is that in the clash between property
rights and ‘‘the genuine despair of people in dire need of accommodation’’,
the courts should not automatically privilege property rights.139 Their role
instead is to find a just and equitable solution in the context of the specific
factors relevant in each particular case. The PEMunicipality case certainly
envisages that there are circumstances in which people may be evicted from
their homes. This could include, for example, situations where people
deliberately invade land with the purpose of disrupting the organised
housing programme and placing themselves in the front of the queue.140
While the provision of suitable alternative accommodation is not an
absolute requirement, it is nonetheless a weighty consideration in the
assessment of whether an eviction order is ‘‘just and equitable’’ in the
circumstances.141
134 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC)
135 PE Municipality case par 21.
136 PE Municipality case par 28.
137 PEMunicipality case par 29: The existence of a housing programme ‘‘designed to house the maximum
number of homeless people over the shortest period of time in the most cost effective way’’ is not
enough to determine ‘‘whether and under what conditions an actual eviction order should be made in
a particular case’’.
138 PE Municipality case pars 39-47.
139 PE Municipality case par 23.
140 PE Municipality case par 26.
141 PE Municipality case par 58.
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The recent decision of President of the Republic of South Africa v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd142 concerned the interpretation of the
State’s duties in the context of a private landowner’s unsuccessful efforts
to execute an eviction order granted in terms of the PIE against a
community occupying his land. At the time of the landowner’s attempted
execution order, it was estimated that the community numbered
approximately 40 000, of whom roughly a third were alleged to be illegal
immigrants.143 The owner was confronted by a demand from the sheriff
of the High Court for a deposit of R1,8 million to secure the costs of the
eviction, an amount exceeding the value of the land. After attempts failed
to get various organs of State to assist him in enforcing the eviction
order, he applied to the court for an order obliging the State to assist him
in vindicating his property rights in terms of the Constitution. The
Constitutional Court did not consider it necessary to resolve the case on
the basis of the landowner’s property rights (in terms of section 25) or the
housing rights of the occupiers (section 26).144 Instead it held that the
State’s failure to take reasonable steps to assist the landowner to
vindicate his property and at the same time avoid the large-scale social
disruption caused by the eviction of a large community with nowhere to
go, was a violation of the principle of the rule of law in section 1(c) as well
as the right of access to courts or other independent forums in section 34
of the Constitution.145 The Court held that the progressive realisation of
the right of access to housing or land for the homeless requires ‘‘careful
planning’’, ‘‘fair procedures’’ and ‘‘orderly and predictable processes’’.146
Land invasions should always be discouraged.147 At the same time, these
measures will not be deemed reasonable if they leave ‘‘no scope
whatsoever for relatively marginal adjustments in the light of evolving
reality’’.148 The novel remedy granted by the Court was to require the
State to compensate the landowner for the unlawful occupation of his
property. Significantly, the order expressly declared ‘‘that the residents
are entitled to occupy the land until alternative land has been made
available to them by the state or the provincial or local authority’’.149
The Court’s decision in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz150
represents a significant development in the Court’s approach to the
review of the obligations imposed by social rights. This case involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of provisions of the Magistrates’ Court
Act that permitted the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to
142 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC).
143 Par 9.
144 Par 26. This is in contrast with the SCA judgement in the case President of the Republic of the Republic
of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 8 BCLR 821. In addition, the SCA held that
the equality provisions in terms of s 9(1) and (2) of the Constitution had also been infringed.
145 Pars 43-51.
146 Par 49.
147 Par 49.
148 Par 49.
149 Par 68, Order par 3(c).
150 2005 1 BCLR 78 (CC).
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satisfy (sometimes trifling) debts. The two applicants, both women of
meagre means, owned homes that had been acquired through the
assistance of State subsidies. When they fell in arrears in respect of very
minor debts (for example for the purchase of vegetables), a judgment was
obtained against them and their homes were ultimately sold in execution.
The effect of such sales-in-execution would be the eviction of people from
their homes. It was also common cause that if the applicants were evicted,
they would have no suitable alternative accommodation.151 The High
Court held that the loss of the right of the applicants to occupy their
homes was not caused by the sale-in-execution process authorised by the
Magistrate’s Court Act. If the judgment debtor elected to ‘‘hold over’’
(remain in occupation after the sale in execution), the PIE would be
applicable to the eviction proceedings brought by the purchaser. The
execution process, though it brings the ownership of the judgment debtor
to an end, does not violate section 26 as this provision did not entitle
anyone to ownership of a home or occupation of a specific residential
unit.152
The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, characterised the
provisions of the Act as authorising a negative violation of section
26(1) in that it permitted ‘‘a person to be deprived of existing access to
adequate housing’’.153 This negative duty is not subject to the
qualifications in subsection (2) relating to resource constraints and
progressive realisation. Where people are deprived of existing access to
housing (and by implication, other socio-economic rights), this consti-
tutes a limitation of their rights which falls to be justified in terms of the
stringent requirements of the general limitations clause (section 36),
including the requirement of law of general application.154 The Court
expressly did not elaborate on the circumstances which would constitute
a violation of the negative duties imposed by the Constitution.155
The Court found no justification for the overbroad provisions of the
Magistrate’s Court Act in terms of the general limitations clause.156 By
way of remedy it ‘‘read in’’ provisions to the Act requiring judicial
oversight of executions against the immovable property of debtors taking
into consideration ‘‘all relevant circumstances’’.157 Among the guiding
factors relevant to the exercise of this judicial oversight is whether an
order authorising the sale-in-execution would be ‘‘grossly dispropor-
tionate’’:
151 Par 12.
152 Par 32.
153 Pars 31-34.
154 In addition, s 36 requires an evaluation of the extent to which the purposes of the limitation is
compatible with ‘‘an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’’. It
also incorporates a stringent proportionality assessment, including the availability of ‘‘less restrictive
means’’ to achieve the State’s purposes. (s 36(1)(e)).
155 Jaftha case par 34.
156 Pars 35-51.
157 Pars 52-67.
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‘‘This would be so if the interests of the judgment creditor in obtaining payment are
significantly less than the interests of the judgment debtor in security of tenure in his or her
home, particularly if the sale of the home is likely to render the judgment debtor and his or her
family completely homeless.’’158
Another consideration is the findingof ‘‘creativealternatives’’ allowing for
debt recovery but which use the sale-in-execution of the debtor’s home ‘‘only
as a last resort’’.159 Thus the fact that a personmight be rendered homeless is
a weighty consideration in judicial oversight over sales-in-execution.
Although the Court has not gone so far as to recognise an unqualified
right to alternative accommodation in eviction cases, it has required
serious consideration of the impact of the eviction and the availability of
feasible alternatives to avoid homelessness. It also illustrates that, in the
context of housing, property rights are no longer automatically
privileged. The housing needs of those who are poor and vulnerable to
homelessness are now highly relevant considerations in cases which
expose people to evictions.
I turn now to evaluate the transformative potential of this jurispru-
dence within the theoretical perspectives developed above.
4 2 The transformative potential of the jurisprudence
I have been critical of the Constitutional Court’s ambivalence regarding
individual entitlements to basic needs.160 I have argued that the model of
reasonableness review creates a number of difficulties for the enforcement of
socio-economic rights by individuals and groups living in poverty.161 The
Court’s reluctance to recognise direct individual positive rights discourages
social rights claiming.162 The bifurcated structure of review for negative and
positive obligations endorsed by the Court in the Jaftha case may also have
problematic implications. While the poor’s access to resources certainly
warrants strong judicial protection, the distinction between strongly
protected negative rights and weakly protected positive rights can operate
tomarginalise the claimsof thosewhoseneeds havebeenneglected, and leave
unexplored the patterns of social exclusion that lie behind unmet needs.
158 Par 56.
159 Par 59.
160 Liebenberg ‘‘South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic Rights: An Effective Tool in
Challenging Poverty?’’ 2002 6 LDD 159; The Interpretation of Socio-economic Rights in Chaskalson et
al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2004) ch 33 particularly at 27-33.
161 Thus the applicants have to marshal a considerable array of economic and expert evidence to
convince the Court that the government’s social policy is unreasonable. See in this regard, Liebenberg
2002 6 LDD 177 187-188.
162 As Scott & Alston ‘‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment
on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise’’ 2000 SAJHR 206 254-255 argue, while public
interest groups are likely to bring challenges to policy and legislation that will benefit disadvantaged
groups in general, individual claimants ‘‘will understandably wish to see something geared more to
their own situation and are unlikely to wish to bring constitutional cases purely to serve as
constitutional triggers for general policy processes’’.
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It is important to recognise that reasonableness review can easily come
to represent a very deferential standard of review. Davis163 argues that
that the concept of reasonableness can be moulded by the courts ‘‘so that,
on occasion, it resembles a test for rationality and ensures that the court
can give a wide berth to any possible engagement with direct issues of
socio-economic policy’’. The danger is that reasonableness review
becomes a proxy for the courts endorsing the State’s own views about
the justifiability of its policies.164
However, I have also argued that reasonableness review has the
advantage of being a flexible, context-sensitive model of review for socio-
economic rights claims.165 Thus the Court held in the Grootboom case
that the reasonableness of a set of measures in giving effect to particular
socio-economic rights has to be assessed in the light of their social,
economic and historical context as well as the context of the Bill of Rights
as a whole.166 In this sense, ‘‘reasonableness review’’ avoids closure and
creates the on-going possibility of challenging socio-economic depriva-
tions in the light of changing contexts. Thus ‘‘reasonableness review’’ can
facilitate the creation of a participatory, dialogical space for considering
social rights claims. This is exemplified by the way in which the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has been able to use reasonableness
review to win a major victory in the provision of appropriate medical
treatment to reduce the risk of the transmission of HIV from mother to
child.167 This victory was a significant breakthrough in the broader
transformative strategy of the TAC to achieve a general anti-retroviral
programme announced by government in August 2003 for people living
with HIV/AIDS. The TAC and other civil society organisations were able
to use the criteria for a reasonable programme established in the
163 2004 5 ESR Review 3 5. As Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 579 point out:
‘‘A characteristic of a legal standard is that considerable interpretative discretion is given to the
adjudicator responsible for its application and that it therefore does not specify an outcome in
advance.’’
164 See Fredman’s critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach in Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney
General) 2002 SCC 84 to the review of social security regulations in Quebec which discriminated in
the provision of welfare benefits against persons under 30 years of age: ‘‘Providing Equality:
Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide’’ 2005 SAJHR 163. Pieterse ‘‘Coming to Terms
with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’’ 2004 SAJHR 383 410-411 also expresses doubt
whether the ‘‘relatively abstract and open-ended nature of the reasonableness inquiry’’ is suitable ‘‘in
developing a socio-economic rights jurisprudence resonating with international law and with the
transformative aims of the constitutional order’’. Bilchitz ‘‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the
Minimum Core’’ 2003 SAJHR 9-10 criticises reasonableness review for failing to adequately develop
the content of the obligations imposed by the various rights and observes that at present ‘‘it seems to
stand in for whatever the Court regards as desirable features of state policy’’.
165 Liebenberg Enforcing Positive Socio-economic Rights Claims: The South African Model of Reason-
ableness Review in Squires, Langford and Thiele (eds) The Road to a Remedy: Current Issues in the
Litigation of Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2005 73.
166 ‘‘Reasonableness must be determined on the facts of each case’’: pars 43-44 92.
167 See the account by Heywood of the TAC’s strategies in theMTCT case: ‘‘Preventing Mother-to-Child
HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment Action
Campaign Case against the Minister of Health’’ 2003 SAJHR 278.
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Grootboom case and the mother-to-child transmission case in broad-
based advocacy for a general anti-retroviral roll-out programme.168
In contrast, a rigid and abstract notion of ‘‘minimum core obligations’’
may have an exclusionary impact as it fails to account for the diversity of
needs and experiences of various groups.169 Moreover, it may be applied
a-contextually and without exploring the underlying factors which
generate socio-economic inequalities and deprivations.170 Its effect can
be to close down debate and artificially curtail an evolution in our
standards of social provisioning as processes of struggle around social
needs unfold. However, I do not believe that a rigid, a-contextual
interpretation is an inevitable feature of an approach advocating for a
more rigorous protection of basic needs. Thus, in recent work I have
explored how to achieve a stronger measure of protection for basic needs
within the structure of reasonableness review.171 This approach will be
elaborated on the following section in which I explore strategies for
realising the transformative potential of social rights.
5 Realising the Transformative Potential of Social Rights
Given accumulated historical injustices, the full realisation of social
rights will require deep-seated structural changes over time. Can the
courts play a meaningful role in facilitating these fundamental changes?
My own view is that there is considerable transformative potential within
the courts’ current social rights jurisprudence. However, the realisation of
this potential depends on the courts giving social rights a sufficiently
substantive interpretation. I identify four areas in which the courts’
interpretation of social rights can facilitate transformation.
5 1 Substantive reasonableness review
First, claims involving a deprivation of basic needs should attract a
high level of judicial scrutiny. I have alluded to the tension in the judicial
interpretation of basic needs between fostering a more participatory,
dialogical space through avoiding overly narrow and rigid interpretations
of basic needs and the importance of articulating clear obligations to
ensure that people’s immediate needs are met. This can be accommodated
within the context-sensitive structure of reasonableness review developed
by the court.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the State’s acts or omissions, the
168 See, eg, the civil society submission on the operational plan for the rollout of an antiretroviral
programme entitled, ‘‘A People-Centred ARV Programme’’ online at www.tac.org.za/Documents/
TreatmentPlan/FullFinalSubmissiontoARVTaskTeam.doc
169 Nussbaum Women and Human Development The Capabilities Approach (2000) 68-70.argues that
approaches to socio-economic justice based on only the distribution of resources is insufficient in that
it fails to take sufficient account of individual variations of need and the extent to which differently
situated individuals can ‘‘convert resources into valuable functionings’’.
170 See the discussion concerning Fraser’s theory of ‘‘thin’’ needs supra.
171 Liebenberg ‘‘The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights’’ 2005 SAJHR 1.
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central consideration should be the position of the claimant in society, the
history and nature of the deprivation experienced and its impact on her
and others in a similar situation.172 A particular focus of this inquiry
should be the impact of the deprivations in question on the ability of the
affected groups to participate as peers in society. Close attention should
be paid to the interaction of the obstacles to participatory parity
identified by Fraser, namely the lack of access to economic and social
resources, the social stigma and stereotypes associated with poverty, and
their interaction with other forms of recognition of injustices such as race,
gender and sexual orientation. In considering the State’s justifications for
failing to ensure that the subsistence needs in question are met, the courts
would be required to conduct a rigorous proportionality analysis (not
dissimilar to the approach of the Court in the Khosa case). In this process,
the courts are well-positioned to highlight the impact of macro-injustices
on particular claimants in concrete situations. Sachs J173 describes the
responsibility of the courts to strive to achieve justice for the litigants
before them against a backdrop of systemic social inequality:
‘‘The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it difficult for the courts to
ensure immediate present-day equity at the micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself correct all
the systematic unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and minimise the
degree of injustice and inequity which the eviction of the weaker parties in conditions of
inequality of necessity entails.’’
It is further important that the assessment of ‘‘reasonableness’’ in
socio-economic rights cases be informed by the requirement of
‘‘progressive realisation’’ in sections 26(2) and 27(2). This concept,
borrowed from article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, implies a dynamic process in which standards
of provisioning improve over time.174 In the Grootboom case, the Court
endorsed the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’
views that ‘‘progressive realisation’’ ‘‘imposes an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible’’ towards the goal of full
realisation. It also endorsed the Committee’s views that ‘‘deliberately
retrogressive measures’’ require justification and close scrutiny.175
The real challenge for social rights litigation is situations where large
groups are currently excluded from social provisioning. This is illustrated
by South Africa’s current social security system. Provision is made for
172 In this respect, socio-economic rights jurisprudence converges with substantive equality jurispru-
dence, particularly in relation to the test for unfair discrimination and the court’s approach to
restitutionary equality: Harksen v Lane No 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) par 53; Minister of Finance v Van
Heerden 2004 11 BCLR 1125 (CC) pars 25-32. For a discussion of this convergence, see De Vos
‘‘Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’’ 2001
SAJHR 258.
173 PE Municipality case par 38.
174 Grootboom case par 45: ‘‘It means that accessibility should be progressively facilitated: legal,
administrative, operational and financial burdens should be examined and, where possible, lowered
over time.’’
175 Par 45 citing with approval General Comment No 3 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights par 9 (emphasis added).
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those formally employed through social insurance schemes,176 and for the
payment, from public funds, of social grants to certain targeted groups
(children, the aged and those living with disabilities).177 However, no
social assistance is provided for children of fourteen years and older178
and adults under 60 years (for women) and 65 years (for men) who live in
poverty and are affected by long-term structural unemployment.179 For
this group (approximately 8.4 million people),180 the right protected in
section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution181 is largely illusory.182 It remains to
be seen whether the courts will, when confronted by a relevant case,
require the State to adopt positive measures to close this gap in social
security provisioning. Of relevance in this context is the obligation
recognised by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of the State to formulate and implement a national strategy and
plan of action to address access to socio-economic rights by the whole
population. This strategy and plan of action must be formulated, and
periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent
process, and must include indicators and benchmarks by which progress
can be closely monitored.183 Even if the courts cannot order the entire
gap in social security provisioning to be immediately closed, they can at
least require participatory planning and the taking of concrete steps
towards the full realisation of this important social right.
It will require constant vigilance to ensure that reasonableness review
does not degenerate into an excessively deferential standard. Placing the
claimants and the nature and history of the deprivation experienced at
the centre of the reasonableness inquiry will help keep the focus on the
systemic social and economic barriers to a more egalitarian society.
5 2 Robust remedies
Secondly, the courts can use their wide remedial powers to grant more
effective remedies in social rights cases. Thus, for example, the courts can
require the State to put in place a plan or programme that facilitates the
changes needed, and to take concrete and targeted steps in terms of that
plan. In this context, the court should overcome its reluctance to grant
176 These include the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA) 130 of 1992,
the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 and a large number of workplace pension fund schemes.
177 These social grants are paid in terms of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 which has recently been
replaced by the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (in force yet?).
178 The definition of ‘‘a child’’ in s 28(3) of the Constitution is ‘‘a person under the age of 18 years’’.
179 See Liebenberg ‘‘The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in
South Africa’’ 2001 17 SAJHR 232.
180 See Streak ‘‘Government’s Social Development Response to Children Made Vulnerable by HIV/
AIDS: Identifying Gaps in Policy and Budgeting’’ IDASA Occasional Paper, 9 September 2005 21.
181 S 27(1)(c) gives everyone the right to have access to ‘‘social security, including, if they are unable to
support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance’’.
182 The only exception is the Social Relief of Distress Grant (SROD) provided for under the Social
Assistance Act. However, this grant is limited to a maximum period of 3 successive months, has
restrictive eligibility requirements and is poorly administered. See Regulations in terms of the Social
Assistance Act 13 of 2004, GN R162 in GG 27316 of 2005-02-22 items 9 14 15 and 23.
183 General Comment No 14 par 43(f); General Comment No 15 par 37(f).
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supervisory remedies in order to facilitate the long-term structural
reforms required to realise socio-economic rights.184 Supervisory orders
have a rich potential not only for the courts to monitor the
implementation of such orders, but also to enhance the participation of
both civil society and the State institutions supporting constitutional
democracy in socio-economic rights litigation. Courts can also give forms
of tangible relief to those experiencing immediate deprivations to avoid
irreparable threats to life, health and future development. The nature and
extent of this relief will depend on the context, but must reflect the
conviction expressed in the Grootboom case that a society ‘‘must seek to
ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality’’.185
By applying a heightened standard of review and robust remedies in
cases where deprivations of basic needs are at issue, the courts can bring
into public consciousness the impact and social consequences of poverty.
Transformation is thus promoted by calling into question existing unjust
resource distributions and affirming rights to social and economic
benefits where previously no such rights were recognised.186
5 3 A transformative discourse
Thirdly, the courts can contribute to transformation by the nature of
their discourse in socio-economic rights judgments. This rhetorical role is
important even where the courts feel constrained by institutional politics
from making orders that will have an extensive impact on existing
budgetary allocations. Thus the courts can resist the temptation to focus
only on ‘‘thin’’ needs, and instead strive to expose the underlying patterns
of social injustice that generate the deprivations in question. Sachs J’s
judgment in the PE Municipality case is an excellent illustration of how
courts can engage with the historical, socio-economic, political and legal
factors behind the eviction of poor people from their homes in South
Africa.187 Judicial discourse of this nature helps to counter the
depoliticising tendencies of adjudication by locating the needs in question
within a broader historical and social context of systemic injustice.
184 On supervisory remedies in the context of socio-economic rights litigation, see Trengove ‘‘Judicial
Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights’’ 1999 ESR Review 8. For criticisms of the Court’s
reticence to grant supervisory orders, see Bilchitz ‘‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum
Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’’ 2003 SAJHR 1 23-
24; Pillay 2002 LDD 275-276; Heywood 2003 SAJHR 311-312.
185 Par 44.
186 In commenting on Michelman’s needs-based theories, Van der Walt Frank Michelman’s Theory of
Social Justice 163 193 and also 198-199 points to an important rhetorical and theoretical implication
of this approach: ‘‘[I]t turns the traditional theoretical strategy of rights-based theories on its head by
concentrating not on legal power, but on individual need, marginality, weakness and powerlessness.
The constitutional guarantee is not based on what one has, but on what one lacks and needs, what
makes one weak.’’ In this way, his theory rejects a purely stabilising, preservative notion of social
justice, and replaces it with norms and principles relevant to the evaluation of distributional
outcomes. On Michelman’s needs-based theory, see Michelman ‘‘The Supreme Court 1968 Term
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’’ 1969 Harv LR 7, ‘‘Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy’’ 1979 Wash LQ 659.
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Furthermore, the courts can assist in destabilising existing stereotypes
and perceptions about the role of publicly provided benefits in society.
This is illustrated by the manner in which Mokgoro J in the Khosa case
subverts the normal discourse around social assistance creating
dependency on the State by highlighting its role in relieving the burden
on poor communities and fostering the dignity of permanent residents.188
Finally, the court’s discourse can serve as a constant reminder that the
redress of poverty and inequality are questions of political morality and a
collective social responsibility. This is illustrated again in the Khosa case
by the following observation of Mokgoro J:
‘‘Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a community
represents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the minimal well-
being of the poor as connected with their personal well-being and the well-being of the
community as a whole. In other words, decisions about the allocation of public benefits present
the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of society.’’189
In this respect, the role of the courts is to keep at the forefront of public
consciousness the vast chasm between the vision of a just society reflected
in the Constitution and social reality. As Langa ACJ (as he then was)
noted in the Modderklip case:
‘‘The fact that poverty and homelessness still plague many South Africans is a painful reminder
of the chasm that still needs to be bridged before the constitutional ideal to establish a society
based on social justice and improved quality of life for all citizens is fully achieved.’’190
Through discourse of this nature, the courts contribute to countering
the ‘‘recognition backlash’’ associated with the provision of social
benefits to the poor.
5 4 Transforming background common law rules
In a market economy, common law background rules structure access
to and distribution to resources. Thus Brand191 argues:
‘‘Although the development of constitutional socio-economic rights to establish new and
unique constitutionally based remedies is an important endeavour on its own, to explore the
full transformative potential of socio-economic rights, sustained critical engagement also with
these common law background rules is crucial.’’
As the cases relating to the evictions and homelessness illustrate, social
rights have contributed to deconstructing hierarchical and absolute notions
187 Pars 8-23.
188 Par 76.
189 Par 74 (footnotes omitted).
190 Par 36 (footnotes omitted).
191 Introduction to Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution (2005) 39. The impact of social
rights on the common law may also take place through the adoption of legislation to give effect to
these rights, eg, the PIE. See Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA) par 16: ‘‘Some may
deem it unfortunate that the Legislature, somewhat imperceptibly and indirectly, disposed of
common law rights in promoting social rights. Others will point out that social rights do tend to
impinge or impact upon common-law rights, sometimes dramatically.’’ See also Roux ‘‘Continuing
and Change in a Transforming Legal Order: The Impact of Section 26(3) of the Constitution on
South African Law’’ 2004 121 SALJ 466.
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of property rights.192 The interest of poor people in the protection of their
homes and in avoiding homelessness is now a highly relevant factor in
eviction cases, and property is no longer the ultimate trump card.193 In
other areas, the courts have been less willing to transform common law
rules in the light of socio-economic rights commitments.194
Although, it is beyond the scope of this paper, the transformatory
potential of the courts’ social rights jurisprudence will not be realised
without broader forms of the processes and practices of adjudication to
make them more accessible and participatory.195 Such reforms would
encompass achieving equitable access to quality legal services, improved
mechanisms for the implementation of social rights judgments, and
transforming judicial ideology and culture.196
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, there will probably be an enduring tension between the
depoliticising tendencies of social rights adjudication and its transforma-
tive potential. Those engaged in social rights litigation need to be
conscious of both tendencies and seek to minimise the former while
maximising the prospects to realising the latter.
The winning of affirmative social benefits through litigation can create
a favourable terrain for broader mobilisation around deeper reforms. A
substantive jurisprudence on social rights can facilitate ‘‘non-reformist
reforms’’ and advance transformation in South Africa. In particular, it
can serve to enhance the participatory capabilities of those living in
poverty and expose the socially constructed nature of poverty and
inequality. At its best it should constantly remind us of our constitutional
commitment to establishing a society based on social justice, and
facilitate the inclusion of marginalised voices in the debate on what is
required to achieve such a society.
However, we cannot take for granted that this transformative
trajectory will be found. Exploring the theoretical underpinnings of
important concepts to our constitutional democracy such as social justice
and transformation can help us in finding our way.
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